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How Professionals (Including Legal
Educators) "Treat" Their Clients
Edwin H. Greenebaum
The goals that professionals and clients join together to achieve are
always concerned in some way with change.' Clients are seeking help to
effect a change, to avoid change being thrust upon them, or to anticipate
and mediate change.
To lawyers and others who "serve," "advise," "counsel," "represent," and
so forth, "treatment" may sound strange as a term for clinical work, but I
have chosen the word to make a point: professional service always changes
the client. Even when changing the client is not the central goal of the
professional service contract, clinical work requires changes in cognition, in
behavioral skills, and in roles and relationships, in order that clients may
understand the service sufficiently to consent to and cooperate with it, and
so obtain its benefits.
Whether changes in clients are the primary goals of treatment, as they
are in education, training, and psychotherapy, or only instrumental goals to
further the treatment of "external" matters, such as clients' legal rights or
status, personal issues are always relevant, for example, developments in
careers, family developments, or growing older. Because personal issues
are involved, both professional and client will tend to approach "treatment"
cautiously and to keep their distance. Even when changes in the client are
explicitly the goal, the wish is that changes be superficial, predictable, and
under control. Those aspects of contracts for clinical services which involve
changes in clients are frequently implicit rather than openly acknowledged
and examined.
Edwin H. Greenebaum is Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. The author is
grateful to Maureen Straub Kordesh for her editorial assistance in preparing this article.
1. A clinic, as I use the term, is a situation in which an individual or group engages the
services of professionals with specialized knowledge and skill in an organizational context
in which professional and client come together in a helping relationship. Law schools are
instances of "clinics." In this text "professionals" are those who are qualified to engage in
clinical work and who, where applicable, are licensed by professional organizations and
subject to their discipline.
Other articles in which I have discussed structural issues common to all clinics include:
The Professional School as a Focus for Clinical Education, 8 J. Legal Prof. 101 (1983)
[hereinafter Greenebaum (1983)]; A Clinical Experience, 9 J. Legal Prof. 101 (1984)
[hereinafter Greenebaum (1984)]; "Understanding. . . ": Processing Information and
Values in Clinical Work, 11 J. Legal Prof. 103 (1986) [hereinafter Greenebaum (1986)];
Understanding Clinical Experience: Working in Groups (in preparation) [hereinafter
Greenebaum (in preparation)]. These materials are part of a book manuscript in
preparation, Understanding Clinical Experience.
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When I confront these issues with law students, they protest that lawyers
are not qualified as "therapists." They are concerned, as well, with issues of
paternalism and contamination (for example, not being able to leave clients'
problems at the office). Interaction with others, however, is not possible
without mutual influence, and changes inevitably occur in professionals as
well as in clients. The professional must digest the client's situation and
determine what the professional discipline teaches about it. Further,
interactions with clients and others in clinical work are significant events
through which the professional's own roles and skills develop.
The following material examines how clinical treatments change the
client and the professional through cognitive learning, skills training, and
the adjustment of roles and relationships. We will also consider the ethical
and political issues that can arise in clinical treatment when the influences
that individuals have on each other are not examined and acknowledged.
I. Cognitive Learning
When dealing with a professional, clients enter a new world. They need
to understand enough about the professional discipline to consent know-
ingly to recommendations made and to collaborate with the professional in
achieving their goals. For law students, who are legal educators' clients, this
understanding has dual objectives: immediately, they must learn what is
necessary to pass their courses and obtain their formal qualifications; for
the future, they need to take with them the cognitive learning they will use
to serve their clients in practice. In law schools, this fundamental instruc-
tional task is often referred to as "teaching legal analysis," as though skills
training, rather than acquisition of subtle and complex cognitive structures,
were the goal.
Every professional discipline has its strange realities. "Proximate cause"
and "cause of action" are not naturally occurring phenomena. But while
laymen complain of professional 'jargon," the problem is not simply the
use of signals by which professionals can identify each other and mystify the
uninitiated, for professional education leads one to see events and circum-
stances in new ways. The concepts that guide clinical work are classifications
imposed upon events, but such classifications are not unreal. They are a
reality-in-the-mind, important because they aid understanding and are
"realities" upon which others act as well.
While the client is confronting a new world of professional doctrine, the
professional, seeking to understand the client's "case," must also enter a
new world. For both client and professional, the problems and processes
are fundamentally the same: recognizing the data of discrete acts and words
is much easier than conceiving data as part of a complex system. When
details (data) become a picture/concept (a gestalt), the learner changes. A
change enabling one to perceive something new differs from the effect of
behavioral skills training, in which practice gradually enables one to come
closer to perfection. 2 The process can be described, but not entirely
2. There are behaviors that can aid cognition, as I will discuss below. See infra at 563.
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explained. It is something we all experience, but of which we are not
entirely in charge. In spite of its familiarity and its extensive examination by
scientists, it remains mysterious. Let me demonstrate, with the help of M. L.
J. Abercrombie's Anatomy of Judgement:3
Most people, when they first look at Fig. 1, see a patchwork of black and white of no
particular form. There will be on each retina of their two eyes an image of the picture,
a dappling of light and shade, faithfully focused on to it by the lens and other
transparent parts of the eye. Of the myriads of receptors in the retina some will
receive light, those corresponding to the bright patches; others will receive less, or
virtually none. And accordingly the nerve fibers running from the receptors to the
brain will carry impulses that are relayed through a complicated network of channels
in the central nervous system. The result of it all is that we are aware of a patchwork.
The messages have been sent in the form of variations of electric potential in the
nervous system and 'seeing' is a result of decoding, translating or interpreting these
messages. In this particular case the result is that we get the information that there is
a meaningless patchwork of black and white blotches.
The messages from the patchwork on the retina can, however, be interpreted in
another way, as the head and shoulders of a man. Some people think the picture
resembles a medieaval representation of Christ. If you have not already seen the man
he may appear if you look at the picture with the following description. His face is
turned towards you, and occupies the middle third of the upper half of the picture.
The top of the picture cuts across the brow so that the top of the head is not shown.
The face is lit from the observer's right-hand side, so that the eyes are in shadow and
the cheeks and chin brightly illuminated. His hair and beard are long, but the chin is
clean shaven and is a white spot catching the light just above the middle of the
picture. A white cloth covers the right shoulder and slopes across the breast; the left
shoulder is turned a little away from you and the right upper sleeve is a black area in
Figure 1. "The Hidden Man. '4
3. Perceiving events and conceiving ideas are similar, if not identical processes. The
experiences feel much the same, and using a visual illustration has the advantage of
permitting writer and reader to share an experience of a concise existential phenomenon
independent of the writer's descriptive interpretation of it. The following discussion relies
heavily on M. L. J. Abercrombie, The Anatomy of Judgement (London, 1960).
Abercrombie, like the present author, became interested in perceptual and conceptual
matters by asking why her students (then in biology) had so much difficulty learning and
transferring their knowledge to new contexts.
4. After Paul B. Porter in 67 Amer. J. Psychology 550 (1954), as quoted in Abercrombie,
supra note 3, at 26
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the lower left part of the picture.
The face may appear as suddenly as when a light has been switched on. Some
people cannot see it with the help of words only, but need someone to trace the
outline of the features over the patchwork. The object has not changed, nor has its
image on the retina, yet the information received from the object is different-no
longer is it seen as a chaotic patchwork, but as the picture of a man, sharp and clear
and characteristic. (For those who still cannot 'see' it an explanatory drawing is given
in Fig. [2 See page 575 below].
This demonstrates that what is perceived depends not only on what is being looked
at but on the state of the perceiver .... The change of the observer... may be the
result of his having looked at the picture for some time, or of his having been given
a verbal description of the man, or a sketched outline of his face. A few people may
see the man immediately. . . . (An artist, for example, asked 'Why is it called the
Hidden Man?') A few others may never see him .... 5
Recognition, however suddenly it seems to occur, is not a phenomenon
that simply happens to us. We actively search our minds for appropriate
cognitive structures (schemata) to translate the available data into a
coherent picture, and, when appropriate schemata are not available, we
must try to modify old schemata or create new ones. Developing the
schemata that make cognition possible is a laborious process, although,
once developed, recognition is usually experienced as instantaneous and
effortless.
Studies of adults congenitally blind because of cataract, who were able to see after
operation, have shown that learning to see is for them an extraordinarily complex
and laborious process. Schemata are built up slowly. It took at least a month for a
patient to learn to distinguish even a small number of objects as other people do.
After thirteen days of training, a patient could not say what was the difference
between a square and a triangle without counting the corners.
6
Gestalts emerge, then, from perceived details (data), as triangles and
squares emerge from lines and corners and the "Hidden Man" emerges
from black and white blotches. When one first encounters confusing new
worlds, however, one is likely to want to keep things simple and to limit
learning goals to perceiving data rather than conceiving comparatively
obscure concepts. Law students, for example, may focus on the particular
indications, definable as data, that would determine when a lawyer should
take a prescribed action, x.hereas faculty try to lead students to see models
of the legal system that will enable them to exercise judgment as lawyers.7
The readily discernable features of cases and other materials studied are the
details out of which the new conceptions must emerge, but the severe
anxiety some beginning law students experience does not make patient
searching for obscure(d) conceptions easy. Professionals and clients, if each
wishes the other to understand, must labor to lead each other to see the
more "hidden" concepts, and, just as in the case of the "Hidden Man,"
didactic demonstration and logic will go only so far.
5. Abercrombie, supra note 3, at 23-25. I am grateful to Century Hutchinson for permission
to quote at length from the Anatomy of Judgement, and to The American Journal of
Psychology for permission to reproduce Paul B. Porter's "The Hidden Man."
6. Id. at 46-47, citing M. Senden (1932), quoted in D. 0. Hebb, Organization of Behaviour
(London, 1949).
7. Greenebaum (1984), supra note 1, at 103-04.
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To apprehend abstractions one needs data from which larger, more
complex conceptions will emerge. Professionals often underestimate (for-
get) the quantity of data required to develop the conceptions of the
professional discipline, while clients may not use all the data available to
them from their prior experience. Clients decide what elements of their
experience they will include in their clinical work 8 and can be hampered,
especially at the outset, by their lack of sufficiently developed models of the
professional discipline or of how the clinic operates to understand what is
relevant or useful. Clients from atypical cultural backgrounds may be
especially hard pressed. Not only may they be inexperienced in some
matters, but some of their experience may be inconsistent with the culture
that the majority of professionals and clients share.
Experience, context, and emotional needs affect the data individuals will
perceive and use. Consider, for example, responses to the illusion of Ames's
"distorted room," which is designed so that it appears an ordinary shape
when viewed through a peephole placed at a special vantage point,
although in fact the floor and ceiling are slanted and the shapes that would
ordinarily be rectangles are actually trapezoids. 9 In this room a marble
appears to roll uphill, and objects and persons appear to be different sizes,
depending on where they are in the room. 10 Usually, individuals looking
through the peephole first see the room as normal and events as distorted;
only later do they learn to see people and events as normal and the room
as abnormal in shape. They "choose" to see the room as normal even
though evidence to the contrary is available. (For example, the occupants of
the room visibly adjust their legs and feet in order to stand upright on a
steeply sloping floor.) Abercrombie suggests that a need to see our
environment as stable explains the failure to see the room as distorted:
8. Greenebaum (1986), supra note 1.
9. Plans and photographs of the "distorted room" appear in Abercrombie, supra note 3, at
42-43.
10. At the Science Museum of London, England, my son, then nine years old, and I had the
experience of seeing ourselves change in size as we walked through such a room in which
the peephole was replaced by a closed-circuit television camera, and, when we positioned
ourselves in the proper corners, my son had the pleasure of seeing himself larger than his
father.
Another demonstration of the impact of experience and context is "The Three
Triangles":
PARIS ONCE\ BIRD
IN THE IN A IN THE
THE &SPRING A LIFETIME THE HA.ND
Read the statement in each triangle. (After R. Brooks, quoted in Abercrombie, supra
note 3, at 28).
In the "The Three Triangles," what one reads is influenced by experience (one
knows the phrases) and by the context of the triangle. If instructed to look more
carefully, the reader may see the extra words.
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We easily get upset and seasick if the world seems to move around us. Our ability to
estimate distances correctly, by interpreting trapezoidal images as rectangles in
perspective for instance, is of the greatest importance to us in moving safely about the
world and getting what we need. When we are forced to admit incongruity we prefer
to see it in movable objects like people rather than in static ones like rooms."
Individuals, thus, go beyond experienced information, drawing infer-
ences and making predictions based on the schemata they associate with
their perceptions. Replacing meaningless data with one clearly right
conception, as in the "Hidden Man," may simply be a challenge. Correcting
stereotypes and other misconceptions, however, requires flexibility and
receptivity in the individual and a learning context that can account for the
variety of factors that influence cognition.
Problems of cognitive learning are complicated when those providing
guidance base their work on multiple and inconsistent conceptions. Law-
yers (including law professors) often have ambivalent feelings arising from
the discrepancy between what the law is and what they unrealistically hoped
it to be.' 2 It is not possible to identify jurisprudential conceptions on which
practitioners, teachers, and judges of the "law" all agree or which an
individual lawyer consistently maintains.'3 Moreover, because the sub-
stance and processes of the law are subtle, complex, and uncertain, their
reality will be resisted by clients (including law students) who seek clear-cut
and certain solutions. The obsessive part of us seeks to remedy the
discomfort of these uncertainties by developing concepts and putting them
in order.' 4 Students come to law school with some ignorance and some
misconceptions regarding the law, and a substantial portion of the effort of
"learning to think like a lawyer" is to acquire apt schemata of "the law."
Students in the midst of courses they previously found confusing often say
that things have suddenly come together for them or that they see the light,
sounding very much as though they had just seen the "Hidden Man."
Cognitive learning, especially in the early critical stages during which
fundamental schemata of the professional discipline are being acquired, is
facilitated in contexts in which clients feel accepted and able to participate
are willing to expose confusions and express conceptions that may be in
error, and in which the ethic is to make one's own discoveries rather than
to indulge the myth that new concepts can be" learned merely by accepting
11. Abercrombie, supra note 3, at 47. Abercrombie notes that newly married couples, in
contrast, tended to see their spouses as normal and the room as distorted. "One might
suppose that they were particularly anxious that their new spouses should remain as they
knew them to be." Id.
12. An instance in which law students seek to learn from legal authorities who speak in
inconsistent voices is described in Greenebaum (1984), supra note 1.
13. Discrepancies in conceptions of the law result when individuals confuse those particular
aspects of the legal system which they have perceived and experienced for the whole, and
when individuals lack fully developed cognitive structures for those aspects of the law
which they have experienced. Of course, conceptions of the law are strongly influenced by
personality and by personal motives for being interested in the law. In my work, I attempt
to be consistent in my explanations of legal phenomena, but my needs, purposes, and
interests vary as I make explanations in different contexts, and I cannot guarantee
consistency even in my own jurisprudential utterances.
14. See David Shapiro, Neurotic Styles (New York, 1965), ch. 2.
Journal of Legal Education
descriptions and exercising logic.' 5
The "Hidden Man" and the distorted room demonstrate that each of us
lives in a world of our own, that cognition is an individual act of unique
discovery no matter how many others may have made the same discovery.
In making discoveries, we exercise selectivity in the schemata we use
according to our interests and needs. 16 We go beyond the data presented to
supplement our immediate perception with other schemata that we asso-
ciate, sometimes unconsciously, with the perception.
At first, when one cannot see a "hidden man" others say they can see,
one may feel that something is wrong with one's mind or that one is the
victim of a joke. The danger, however, is not that conceptions of the
professional discipline, or of clients' cases, will never appear. "Blanks"
seldom occur. The danger is rather that the schemata that do emerge will
be incomplete and represent only distortions of reality, and that, once
found, these partial, distorted images will be held tenaciously and contin-
ually undermine the quality of clinical work.
II. Skills Training
"Skill" is behavior that enables one to achieve chosen objectives.
Through the skills training aspect of clinical "treatment," professionals help
clients behave in ways that will achieve the clients' goals. For example, labor
lawyers guide behavior relevant to better labor relations and to compliance
with labor relations statutes. Because acquiring skills is a complex process,
professional students need guidance to develop to the point where they
have sufficient understanding and ability to permit them to improve their
skills in practice. Skilled clinical instructors can provide useful models of
professionals who enable clients to cooperate in clinical work and benefit
from it in the future.
The process of learning behavior, as viewed in behavioral learning
theory, may be described in a simple model. A behavior follows a stimulus
and is in turn followed by experiences that reward or punish; these
subsequent experiences either reinforce the behavior or, by failing to
reinforce it, extinguish it. In this view, behavior is not "caused" by the
stimulus, because the stimulus may be followed by alternative responses,
15. The ideal of "Socratic" law school teaching might have just these possibilities, but, in
practice, typical classes are too large, the discourse is too oriented to the instructor, the
teaching atmosphere too disciplinary, error and confusion are too embarrassing, and
attachments to the cultures of other groups and the cross-currents of intergroup relations
are too strong to realize the possibilities. In such a context, students are unlikely to
contribute as fully as they might from the diversity of their backgrounds. Written work,
small group discussion, role enactments, and clinical experience can be useful parts of a
participatory, active learning strategy.
16. "If my son and I go for half an hour's walk together we will give on our return a different
account of what was in the street, he of the make, horse-power and the date of the cars on
the road, I of the range and prices of goods in shop windows. As a result of an apparently
common experience, each of us will have added different information to his store, and as
we have seen, those differences in the store of information will affect future receipts of
information." Abercrombie, supra note 3, at 58. Cf. Richard Bandler and John Grinder,
The Structure of Magic (Palo Alto, Calif., 1975), ch. 1.
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but by the "contingencies of reinforcement."' 17
In this model, learning behavior involves discrimination, repetition, and
consistent reinforcement. The behavior to be learned must be experienced
as discriminated from other aspects of the context in which it occurs,
including associated behaviors, if it is to be focused upon and experienced
as rewarded (in swimming or in bowing a violin, for example, bending the
wrist is discriminated from moving the arm). Practice is said to make
perfect. Repeated behavior consistently rewarded establishes consistent skill
practice. The importance of discrimination and repetition will be recog-
nized by those who have developed skills in athletics or in playing a musical
instrument. Delayed reinforcements that are not plainly connected with
discriminated behaviors, such as grades at the end of courses, are not as
effective as the immediate rewards of approval that follow specific events.
Reinforcements (rewards or, less effectively, punishments) may be
external or internal. External reinforcements come from all who experi-
ence and react to the behavior in question-in the case of professional
students, from instructors, fellow students, employers, and family. One
internal reinforcement is the pleasure of accomplishment, which is among
the strongest rewards. An individual's conscience and defenses against
anxiety, of course, will tend to reinforce or extinguish behavior. Behavior
that persistently causes internal distress is unlikely to be learned no matter
how consistently it is rewarded by others.
Both external and internal reinforcements have serious problems of
consistency. The many people who, in different roles and contexts, respond
to an individual's behavior may apply different measures of quality, and
because many of these people themselves have internal inconsistencies,
they may respond inconsistently. The reinforcement process is further
jeopardized if the skill learner has not developed apt schemata for the
behaviors involved. If discrete behaviors are not discriminated, for exam-
ple, reinforcements may be experienced as inconsistent when in reality they
are responses to different behaviors. Inconsistent internal reinforcements
are the result of multiple images of good and bad which have become part
of an individual's conscience. The strength of reinforcements, internal and
external, relates to the significance of its source, which in turn depends on
the relative importance of the individual's various attachments and group
memberships. Unless desired behavior recurs consistently, it must be
assumed that other, inconsistent behavior is also being reinforced and that
the skill has not been learned. When the exercise of skill depends on
making uncertain "clinical" judgments, however, it may be difficult to
evaluate consistency.
Social interaction always influences behavior; that is, as individuals
interact, they inevitably teach each other how to behave.' 8 The process may
17. B. F. Skinner, About Behaviorism (New York, 1974).
18. As professional and client interact each trains the other to be the professional and client
he or she needs. This process can be viewed both as behavior modification, which is the
subject of this section, and as the negotiation of a relationship, which will be the focus of
the next.
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or may not be intentional or conscious. In fact, the result may sometimes be
inconsistent with the one consciously intended. From a base of biologically
determined propensities, infants learn social skills from the beginning, and
habits of dominance or submissiveness, helplessness or self-reliance, among
many others, become persisting aspects of personality. Thus, effective
behavior (skill) may be developed without the guidance of rules: children,
for example, learn to manipulate their parents without awareness or
understanding of the process. Much behavior is learned by imitation.
Children mimic adults, and when the resulting behavior is reinforced, not
only is that specific behavior learned but the general propensity to acquire
behavior by modeling is reinforced. 19
Clinical skills are learned through the experience of practice in the sense
that they are acquired through these processes of social interaction and
modeling. That is how law professors, for example, generally learn to teach.
These learning processes occur whether or not they are deliberately
planned, with no assurance of reflection, critical evaluation, or quality. 20
When they are planned-thus creating a "therapeutic community"-the
method and intent of the strategy may be developed cooperatively or
unilaterally, and when developed unilaterally, the plan may be disclosed or
concealed. When the objects of the treatment are mental patients or
prisoners, even participation in the clinical relationship may not be volun-
tary, raising serious issues of ethics and politics. 2'
Conceptions about skillful behavior are required if a community is to
communicate about and make "reasoned" decisions regarding desirable
behavior. "Rules" to measure and evaluate skills may concern either desired
results or desirable behavior, presumably because the specified behavior is
thought to be effective for valued goals. For instance, in interviewing a new
client, a professional's goals may be to obtain information, establish trust,
and reach agreement about future work, and his or her skill may be
evaluated by the results obtained. Alternatively, behaviors useful to achieve
these goals may include being nonjudgmental (in the value sense), 22 for
example, allowing clients to speak without excessive interruption, listening
carefully, and explaining clearly what the professional is able and willing to
do and the terms for doing it.23 Conceptions of such results and behaviors
19. A very useful exposition of the relation of instinct and learning in acquiring behavior is
contained in John Bowlby, Attachment, 2d ed. (New York, 1983), pt. 2.
20. With my focus in this section on the impact on skills of interaction between professionals
and clients, I cannot explore here the development of skills through reflection in the
course of practice. See Donald A. Sch6n, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals
Think in Action (New York, 1983) for exposition of the nature and function of
"reflection-in-action."
21. See infra at 573-75. Cf. B. F. Skinner, Walden Two (New York, 1982).
22. When the authorities advocate that an interviewer should be nonjudgmental, they mean
that the interviewer should accept the client without judging the client to be good or evil,
that is, without condemning or condoning. In scientific work, in contrast, exercising
judgment is the business of making predictions by comparing one's perception of evidence
to the models of systems in one's mind.
23. Focus on results or on behavior rules of performance involves different structures of
rewards and allocations of responsibility. A worker can be instructed to behave a certain
way, given a specified indication, for example, to throw a switch if a dial gives a specified
reading. In this instance, the worker's reward will not depend on occurrence of the result
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must be developed if the events are to be recognized and measured as they
occur.
Deliberate skills training frequently begins with rule-governed behavior,
progresses to behavior directly governed by the contingencies of results,
and evolves from self-conscious attention to behavioral details to fluid use
of behavior complexes uninhibited by consciousness of detail.24 In learning
to drive an automobile, for example, the initiate can be taught "rules" about
letting out the clutch, maintaining distances between vehicles, and slowing
down and accelerating in curves, but as drivers become skillful, they behave
effectively without conscious thought of those rules. They are guided only
by the intention to get from here to there. Those who have learned a skill
can sometimes act without any deliberation at all. A hazard of this process
is that skills may become habits practiced without reflection or evaluation.
Skills are sometimes taught without analysis or any rule other than "do as
I do," but sophisticated skills instruction combines multiple approaches.
The desire and ambition to develop the requisite behavior, combined
with patience and perseverance, are among the attitudes, character, and
values critical to learning skills. One's values influence the goals chosen,
affect what professionals and clients are willing and able to perceive,
provide part of the motivation for expending the energy and enduring the
discomforts required to conform to adopted measures, and determine
whether a behavior will be internally reinforced. To a great extent,
developing attitudes involves working through the implications of making
choices. In work situations, values and goals frequently come into conflict
(for example, achieving results sometimes conflicts with honesty). How
inconsistencies and ambivalence are confronted will have profound effects
on skills. Thus, professionals who rely exclusively on rules in skills training
are likely to be disappointed with the results.
As a case study, I will focus for analysis on a single instance of skills
training in professional education. In legal education, the dominating skills
concern is thinking/communicating/[re]searching [t/c/s] behavior. While the
priority given in the first year of law school to teaching students "to think
like lawyers" is based on its pervasive importance to all lawyering, the aspect
most often focused on involves cognitive learning of legal content and
making connections between legal content and stated fact situations.
Thinking, communicating, and searching are inseparable processes. Think-
ing about a subject requires both an understanding of others' oral and
written communications and the ability to articulate, and thus communi-
cate, one's own developed understanding. Merely finding and understand-
ing the facts and holding in a court opinion requires sophisticated deci-
phering. Searching is required not only to find material-in one's
experience or in the library and elsewhere-that will help assess implica-
tions and build generalizations but, more basically, to find in one's own
intended by the instructor. In contrast, the worker may be the one responsible for
achieving the result, being guided by an understanding of cause and effect in the
machine's operating system.
24. Skinner, supra note 17, at 138-41.
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mind the most appropriate schemata to connect with the material being
experienced. While the crystallization of a conception is usually something
that just happens (one does not practice seeing the "Hidden Man"), t/c/s
behavior helps such an event occur.
The aspect of t/c/s skill which law students most need to develop is, in my
experience, searching. Searching involves patience, perseverance, and
flexibility-flexibility to indulge free association, to choose the most apt
schemata for the resulting cognitive structures from among the largest
possible pool of associations, and to give new conceptions an opportunity to
emerge. Too frequently students seize and settle upon the first associations
that come to mind, and do not bother to discuss them with others for reality
testing and for obtaining the benefit of another's experience. We sometimes
complain of students' poor logic, but more frequently the problem is
distorted and limited perception.
Searching is certainly critical to thinking like a good lawyer, as it is for
thinking generally, but law students frequently find it difficult for several
reasons. A student's prior education may not have included t/c/s skill
learning, searching behavior may not have been consistently rewarded, and
a student may not have acquired schemata by which to recognize the
presence or absence of searching behavior. Searching may, in fact, be an
intellectual activity not highly valued in the general culture and not
consistent with the expectations and personal agenda of some students.
That is, students coming to legal education expect a particular style of
cognition to be relevant. Their primary concern is that their careers satisfy
their personal needs, and among those needs resourceful thinking may not
have a high priority. Further, students may find that the nature of legal
education disables them from using the skills they have acquired earlier.25
As they begin their legal education, they are on unfamiliar ground, worried
about being put on the spot among strangers in large groups, 26 coping with
a heavy work load,27 seeking to master subject matters which do not
conform to their expectations. Some students feel that their previous
academic rewards and certifications of accomplishment are somehow
fraudulent, and they worry that they will fail in this new program in which
their future careers are at stake.
In typical law school courses faculty teach t/c/s skills principally through
modeling and through social interaction in "Socratic" dialogue. In the
terms used throughout this discussion, results rather than behavior are
modeled and rewarded. Faculty feel that they reward sound reasoning, but
such reasoning tends to be the completed structure of inferences and
deductions built on plausible premises and not the t/c/s processes of
construction. That is, students receive comments and are given illustrations
about the results of t/c/s for legal content and applications, but they receive
25. See Greenebaum (1984), supra note 1.
26. See Greenebaum (in preparation), supra note 1.
27. A student comments, "Have you ever considered the possibility of fatigue as an
explanation? Do you know how hard it is to think after 14 hours of reading, briefing,
outlining, and putting the day's work into context?, ot1 [in responding to] professors who
ridicule students for being idealisticnaive or even tell students not to think?"
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little direct help in building a model of thinking/learning processes. For
example, while students are told what to include in a brief of a case, little
attention is paid to how one arrives at the stage of being able to summarize
concisely the significant aspects of a court opinion. The implication of this
kind of instruction is that one should "get it right," and beginning students
frequently learn in class that they have not.
The classroom ethic requires students to come up with results that
answer the instructors' questions correctly; the display of groping mistakes
is not rewarded. Instructors might offer good models of t/c/s behaviors, but
their interrogative styles tends not to be "Socratic" in this sense. Instructors
are supposed to know the answers without evident effort; they are valued
for the ease with which they are brilliant. Instructors who express their
tentative explorations are perceived as confusing, and students who speak
tentatively are experienced by professors and students as wrong (and not
brilliant). In these circumstances, students are left to develop schemata of
t/c/s behavior largely on their own.
As students answer an instructor's questions or volunteer comments,
they experience the responses of faculty and classmates as rewarding or
punishing. Reinforcements experienced by many students are
predominatly negative and are less effective than positive rewards which
create feelings of support and togetherness. Instructors suggest that if
students love good thinking and pursue it with vigor, at the end of the
course they will be rewarded with a good grade which will enable them to
get ahead. While students develop some conceptions of good results, the
principal test of their learning is, typically, a final examination, to which the
response is a single overall grade that the student may not receive for
several weeks. This reward comes too late, and many students despair that
they will ever receive a grade they feel is good. For many students, their
ambition comes to be to get along rather than to get ahead.
Most faculty provide models of individuals who love good thinking by
the examples they set, by the rewards they give, and by demonstrating how
good thinking can be integrated into a successful, satisfying career and way
of life. Some students have difficulty, however, in responding to this model
because they feel that they will not be able, or that it may be hazardous, to
emulate the faculty model. Many students feel that instructors inhabit an
alien world of elite backgrounds and extraordinary abilities, a career world
whose valued attitudes may be different from those of the world of legal
practice. Students have fewer contacts with faculty than with each other and
with outsiders, and the models and reinforcements students give each other
are frequently more powerful than those faculty members provide.
These conditions limit the teaching of t/cs behavior in typical law school
courses. In fact, faculty continue to be distressed by the quality of students'
thinking in the second and third year of law school and with the products
of lawyering work of alumni.
To the extent tic/s skills teaching is effective in typical law school classes,
it may have an unintended effect. Since the t/c/s processes most used and
focused upon in legal education are those related to legal doctrine and
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associated aspects of legal content, there are dangers that other dimensions
of t/c/s skills will be neglected and remain undeveloped and that the
emphasized behaviors will become so highly valued that they will be
persistently relied upon, even for tasks for which complementary t/c/s
behaviors might be more appropriate. Behavior that facilitates understand-
ing of legal doctrines and processes in written authorities does not suffice
for teasing out the complexities and ambiguities of clients' situations in an
interview.
There is considerable interplay between skills learning, cognitive learn-
ing, and adjusting roles and relationships. For example, law students
frequently assert that their controlling style in initial client interviews is
necessary, arguing that to use time most efficiently, they have to interrupt
clients' irrelevant statements. In skills training these students may come to
see that, at the outset, clients (as those who know about their situations) may
be better judges of relevancy than the professional, that interruptions may
unsettle and confuse clients, causing them to forget or omit important
matters; that, by interrupting, interviewers lose the opportunity to observe
clients in a state less contaminated by interaction with the interviewer, and
that interrupting may not be efficient, for when the interviewer is talking,
the client is not. Once they have recognized these factors and have
practiced less controlling behavior, students may understand that they are
making choices regarding professional roles and relationships.
III. Adjusting Roles and Relationships
In every phase of their work, professionals and clients make choices
regarding their roles. While they lack experience with each other, they act
in roles derived from prior experiences. As they fulfill the requirements of
different aspects of their work together and learn to understand each other,
they explicitly or implicitly negotiate what the terms of their roles will be in
the specific case, although their emotional needs may divert them from
strictly task-related role behavior.28
One choice that professionals and clients make, for example, is whether
to adopt the role of one who persuades or of one who learns. 29 Persuaders
attempt to induce others to accept the validity of their own propositions,
while learners invite others to join in a process of discovery. Both roles have
value, and professionals and clients must adopt different postures for
different aspects of their work. At the outset of clinical relationships, when
clients know a great deal more about themselves and their problems than
do professionals, the learning mode would seem most appropriate for the
professional. Authoritarian habits and the need to defend professional
positions, however, may make a learner's role difficult, especially when
persuasion is a publicly conspicuous part of the job description, as it is in the
legal profession. Models of human relationships which assume that be-
28. See Greenebaum (in preparation), supra note 1.
29. RobertJ. Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical
Practice Instruction, 40 Md. L. Rev. 223 (1981).
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tween professional and client either one or the other must be in charge do
not support shared exploration 3 0
While professionals and clients are adjusting their roles to each other,
they also manage their roles in other significant relationships. Solving a
client's problems frequently involves adjustments of the client's continuing
roles and relationships. For the client, illness, divorce, labor relations with
a union, becoming a professional, even writing a will, all involve adjust-
ments in roles and relationships with business associates, family, and
friends. And lawyers are concerned with their roles in relation not only to
their clients but to their firms. Consider, for example, a lawyer recently
employed by a firm who interviews a client who seeks counsel about a
proposed transaction in which the client would lease a commercial property
to the son of a friend. Such matters involve an interplay of business,
personal, and legal concerns, and lawyers, in representing their firms, act
on their understanding of their authority and responsibilities when they
decide how far to go in counseling clients in these different aspects.
Clinical work can have therapeutic effects even when therapy is not the
principal work of the clinic. For example, people often have problems in
part because they have difficulty in their relationships with others. Trou-
bled individuals frequently view their world as one in which people exist to
use each other and do not have mutually constructive relationships. The
attorney who acquiesces in being only a tool, a "hired gun," of such a client
reinforces those beliefs and behaviors which involve the client in difficult
situations. The professional will either be part of the solution or part of the
problem. There is no way to stand apart.
Unless their training has prepared them for work with social relations
and mental health matters, professionals may express discomfort with and
may even deny the idea that adjusting roles and relations is part of the
service they render clients. There are some professions whose primary
focus is treating roles and relations, and other professions may wish to
assign all roles and relations concerns over to them. All professionals,
however, by the work settings they create, by their interactions with clients,
and by the choices they help clients make, inevitably effect adjustments in
the clients' roles and relations. The only question is whether this aspect of
the treatment will be conscious and deliberate or part of a hidden,
unplanned agenda.
The relevance of cognitive and skills learning to adjusting roles and
relationships is clear. Conceptions of both roles and potential skills must be
acquired. For example, professionals and clients must conceive models of
"learning" and "persuasion" postures and must learn behaviors appropriate
to these models before they are able to choose among them. An individual's
behavioral repertoire is inevitably limited, and yet the possibility of greater
behavioral flexibility may be explored in skills development. Teamwork
among those with complementary capabilities-among professionals (of
the same and of different professions), between professional and client,
30. Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge (New York, 1974).
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within the client (when the client is a group), and between the client and
others-can also compensate for individual limitations. But a conception of
collaborative relations and rehearsal of the requisite behavior are what
make the choice possible.
In making choices, individuals apply their values to their perceptions of
facts. Some values are acquired early in life; others may be adopted as one
joins new groups. Perceptions of good and bad are affected by one's
understanding of cause and effect in social processes. Values are what make
adjusting roles and relations something more than cognitive learning and
acquiring skills.
Among the values affecting an individual's role choices are those
associated with social survival. For professionals, acting in a way that might
prejudice one's career may not seem like an available choice. The alcoholic
whose behavior is destroying him may perceive sobriety as a threat if he
feels his social survival is at stake. Even testing the reality of such concerns
may feel risky. The most seductive and corrupting conflicts of interest in
clinical work are frequently very subtle.3' Becoming acquainted with role
possibilities, recognizing the implications of choices, developing attitudes
toward taking risks, and making commitments are the core of being
responsible in roles and relationships.
Deliberate treatment of roles and relations is likely to have one of two
orientations, either to the formal rules (and their application) that limit
choice or to the factors that influence choice within those rules. Lawyers'
conduct, for example, is constrained by codes of professional responsibility,
rules of court procedure, and legislation (such as anti-trust laws), and by
courts and bar organizations that make decisions applying such rules.
Similarly, clients must understand how they are governed, for example, by
legislation controlling labor relations, by court decrees in divorce and child
custody, and by contracts and leases to which clients have consented.32
Within the constraints of rules and their authoritative application, however,
professionals and clients have discretion to choose, significant roles and
relations issues can be resolved by individual perceptions of fact and
application of values. The more difficult the, role choice, in fact, the less
likely it is to be governed by a clear rule. Professionals and clients may share
the wistful hope that reasoned discussion can resolve dilemmas and that
codes of responsibility can provide clear and generally acceptable guidance
for role choices. The ethical problems facing professional and client,
however, are often true dilemmas, and decisions regarding them will not be
universally acceptable. To decide whether such issues should be governed
by authoritative rules or left to individual conscience is itself a matter of
applying values to perceptions of fact.
31. Edwin H. Greenebaum, Attorneys' Problems in Making Ethical Decisions, 52 Ind. L.J. 627
(1977).
32. In addition to law, sociology and economics, among other disciplines, provide insight into
the institutions that make constraining decisions.
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Contrasting approaches to treating roles and relations are illustrated by
traditional courses in The Legal Profession 33 and by my course, "Roles and
Relations in Legal Practice. '3 4 Legal Profession courses tend to emphasize
content and processes of institutional decision making (by courts and bar
associations), while "Roles and Relations in Legal Practice" emphasizes
choices made by individual lawyers; the former focuses more on doctrinal
and sociological materials, the latter more on psychology. Legal Profession
tends to use the instructional methods of typical law school courses, while
"Roles and Relations" is atypically experiential and nondirective, leaving
the students to learn on their own from the course's role-enactment
exercises and group discussions. It relies on consultation with rather than
direction from the instructor. While classes in Legal Profession discuss in
passing what students would do when confronted with dilemmas within
permitted choices, confronting issues of choice is the primary focus of
"Roles and Relations."
Deliberate attention to teaching roles and relations is, regrettably,
frequently given low priority. This may be so even in professional schools
in which learning "professionalism" would seem to be a central matter. For
example, in typical law school courses, in which the majority of legal
education's teaching resources are invested, professionalism is taught
through what is generally known as the "pervasive approach." Occasionally,
a brief portion of a course may focus on ethical issues raised by the
particular subject matter. More often, however, questions of ethical practice
are noted in passing in materials being studied principally for other
purposes.3 5 The issue is usually raised and discussed for a while, and then,
under the press of time, the class returns to the main agenda. On most roles
and relations matters, the dominant assumption seems to be that students
will adopt the mores and modus vivendi of their employers and practice
33. A.k.a., "Professional Responsibility." Not all courses offered under these titles are
"traditional" in the ways described. "Roles and Relations in Legal Practice" (see note 34
infra) was in fact first offered experimentally under the legal profession label.
34. The purpose of "Roles and Relations in Legal Practice" is to introduce law students to
interpersonal phenomena in law practice and to lead students to reflect on lawyer's roles
and their personal relation to these roles. Edwin H. Greenebaum and Phyllida Parsloe,
Roles and Relations in Legal Practice, 28. J. Legal Educ. 228 (1976); Greenebaum (1983),
supra note 1, at 112-15. The course examines selected work- and decision-making roles
frequently played by attorneys and evaluates the professional issues-personal, ethical,
and legal-that typically arise in the various contexts. For each project students are given
a fact situation that requires them to enact roles of lawyers, clients, senior partners, and
others involved in the situation. Class work uses the students' behavior as evidence in
demonstrating and making explicit the models in students' minds on which they act. When
the students realize that they have each seen things differently and have chosen to act in
different ways, the search for explanations of their diverse responses leads to instructive
discussions. Similarly, when the group acts uniformly-even though useful alternatives
can be demonstrated to exist-and when no one appears to see things that are plainly
visible, the collusions, which inhibit using diverse experience and competencies, also beg
explanation. Examining the parallels between present and future realities is helpful. As
students enact the roles of lawyer and client, they can compare their enacted roles to their
work with me as my clients and thus learn to conceive how lawyers' clients may feel.
Distrustful of my intrusiveness in their work, students resist my control, yet want me to
make the practice of law safe for them. Learning to work responsibly with each other in
law school can help them consider strategies for preserving their ideals in practice.
35. See e.g., Greenebaum (1984), supra note 1, at 110-12.
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communities. Different areas of legal practice typically confront lawyers
with different ranges of ethical dilemmas, and students search for a practice
in which they can be both comfortable and ethical. On the whole, students
in legal education are left to gather impressions from unsystematic chance
encounters without programmed assistance.
Professional students might be expected to concentrate on roles and
relations issues in clinical fieldwork placements where they encounter
practitioners, faculty, and fellow students as models and make their own
operational choices in practice contexts. The degree to which roles and
relations instruction is planned, however, varies in clinical education, as
does the extent of reflective examination on professionalism issues, and
different aspects of professionalism will be emphasized according to the
interests of faculty, supervising attorneys, and students. 36 Many law stu-
dents gain clinical experience outside the formal curriculum in non-credit
clinics and part-time employment, and supervision for educational pur-
poses may be very limited.
The impact of clinical work on participants' roles and relationships,
then, frequently occurs through unplanned and unexamined processes.
When the role is one in a major helping profession, the matter is of
community as well as of individual importance. Assuming roles in groups is
one aspect of the evolution of an individual's identity, which relates political
phenomena to individual growth. Erik Erikson notes a human propensity
for pseudo-speciation, in which individuals associate themselves with
"good" and project onto foreigners and pariahs their negative identities.37
"Ritualizations of everyday life" are devices for identifying and associating
(and being identified and associated) with the good. The need for such
associations is satisfied by membership in religious, national, and other
significant social groups, and family life mediates entry into these groups
through an extended, dependent childhood. In adolescence, we search for
and "choose" (sometimes after or in rebellion) an identity we feel to be our
own. In this era in which society has the means to destroy itself, Erikson
vests his hope for our survival in identification with the real species,
universal humanity. Meanwhile, we well may be concerned that for many
individuals, old identifications with pseudo-species such as church and state
seem less satisfactory, and more atomistic identifications more attractive-
in extreme cases to narcissistic identification with one's self and an ethic of
"doing one's own thing."
Assuming professional roles would seem to serve dual (sometimes
contradictory) functions, serving as a medium relating to overrearching
societies and providing, in itself, a pseudo-species with which to identify.
36. Giving cognitive and skills learning higher priority than professionalism may seem a
necessity when the immediate interests of clients are at stake. Cf. Robert J. Condlin, The
Moral Failure of Legal Education (College Park, Md., 1981). Clinical faculty and
supervising attorneys tend to be individuals who seek to combine the satisfactions of
teaching and practice, and a predominant interest in teaching professionalism in its broad
aspects is not always a necessity.
37. Erik H. Erikson, Toys and Reason: Stages in the Ritualization of Experience, 60-64,
75-113 (New York, 1977).
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Joining a profession and searching for the good and the bad in professional
life thus can serve an individual's developmental needs. By the time
students enroll professional school, they are largely past adolescence, and
their individual identities are almost, if not completely, developed. Any new
identifications professional students make, then, must be elaborations on
trends already established, and these trends will determine whether a
student will be inclined to identify with the diligent, the intellectual, the
aggressive, the tough, the controlling, the political and the practical, the
caring, the self-made individual, or the communal collaborator. Diverse
students will take on aspects of several such identifications, meanwhile
adopting the rituals by which they will recognize and be recognized
members of the subspecies they have chosen. Some students opt out of
certain group identifications very early, searching for, fantasizing about,
and hoping to find the groups to which they can belong in practice. This
process has profound implications for politics in each profession, and in
professional schools subgroups of faculty and students develop the need to
separate themselves from and distrust each other. These processes of group
differentiation are inherent in human development and not to be wished
away.38
Many law students feel caught in the strong currents of preprofessional
waters, adrift without charts or navigation equipment. They feel the need
to find a safe way to shore. Some, especially those who receive the positive
feedback of good grades, associate themselves with those who will be on the
law review and progress to practice with large firms where the intellectual
aspects of and intensive submersion in the law will be valued. Others say,
with both relief and affirmation, that they have realized they will not be
intellectual lawyers and that they will not invest so much time and energy
into law as might interfere with other valued aspects of their lives. These
choices, of course, have many themes and variations. Each emerging group
needs to feel itself an elite, and so each finds negative qualities in the others:
sloppy and lower quality work, na'ivet6 and lack of practical orientation;
some are sellouts to "the system," others, do-gooders more concerned with
protecting the slothful and guilty than victims and hard workers, and so
forth. But in each group some members will live with the doubts arising
from their chosen identification depending on denying aspects of them-
selves.
Faculty frequently avoid direct examination of the impact of law
schooling on roles and relations by maintaining that their task is to convey
knowledge and hone intellectual skills; that little can be done to change
students because their characters are already formed by the time they come
to law school; and that each individual's psyche is nobody else's business.
But even more determinative than such faculty views is the structure of the
law school institution in which there is no subsystem primarily concerned
38. Deliberate intervention that affects the trend of professional development by making
fundamental adjustments in attachments and cognitive configurations bucks the "conser-
vative impulse." Peter Marris, Loss and Change, 4-22 (London, 1974). The work roles
that a professional adopts will have influence beyond the boundary of the professional self
and permeate nonprofessional life and relationships.
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with the development of roles and relations.39 We faculty members, of
course, stand to gain by protecting our elite and avoiding intimate
examination of our role in the profession. Bitterly complaining members of
the bench and bar also collude in protecting the status quo. Their expressed
dissatisfaction with law schools focus on neglected knowledge and skills they
think important to successful and acceptable practice in areas important to
them. Each group seeks to promote its own particular identity instead of
trying to find or conceive of one species, "lawyer," capable of accommo-
dating and using diverse and complementary aptitudes and orientations.
Students collude in maintaining the status quo because the multiplicity of
lawyer species is likely to provide them some niche in which they fit, and
also allows them to avoid testing their power to change matters, even
though, for many students, the collusion comes at the cost of part of the
"ideal" of their futures.
Another significant and also frequently unplanned way in which roles
and relations are taught is by example, and the result, in my view, is too
often unfavorable. In law school, where single instructors meet very large
classes, it is difficult for faculty to assume the role of learner, to be models
of those who can accept as well as give help and who can work construc-
tively with the personal dimensions of their clients' learning problems.
Instructors are strongly motivated to avoid these personal aspects of
treatment because such matters require some intimacy and because, if one
has not been trained to recognize it, one may fear overstepping the
bounda' between education and therapy.
In their academic studies professional students are already operating in
a professional role, developing the attitudes and behaviors they will carry
into their practices. Students make choices-for example, in how they use
their time-that will affect the services they render to their future clients.
Their own behavior and that of fellow students and faculty provide
students with models of diligence and resourcefulness, of helping relation-
ships, and of reflection (or the absence of it) on roles and relations issues.
Responding to dilemmas can be very difficult for persons who prefer to
resolve problems by the technical application of rules. Many issues of
practice, however, are not realistically amenable to resolution by rules.
When individuals are incapable of working out such issues on their own
authority and must resort to an external authority to provide an effortless,
"magical" solution, there are costs. The posture of a professional helper
who in turn needs (can use) no help is an awkward one. It creates an
imbalanced relationship in which trust is difficult. All humans need help
from time to time, and especially professionals, including lawyers and
teachers, need their clients' help in rendering them the services most
responsive to their clients' needs. Making mistakes is acutely awkward for
those who find it difficult to reconcile themselves to the reality that their
work will always be a partial success and a partial failure.
[Re]learning roles and relationships is part of improving the client's
39. Cf. Eric J. Miller & A. Kenneth Rice, Systems of Organization, 3-42 (New York, 1967).
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status in clinical contexts, including professional education, and even when
the professional discipline is not psychotherapy, clinical work will have
therapeutic implications. Professional helpers are significant models, and if
professionals are therapeutic in their working relationships (as opposed to
being therapists), clients in turn may be more constructive in their
relationships outside the boundaries of the clinic. To act as though clinical
work affects only technical matters within the boundaries of a professional
discipline reflects purely wishful thinking.
IV. The Ethics and Politics of Treatment
Clinical work requires the encounter of two minds each with its own
values and its own view of the makeup of the social world. Professionals and
clients will be changed by their encounters with each other and will, to some
degree, have to accommodate themselves to social realities constructed by
others. Thus, clinical work always has ethical and political dimensions.
Consider the experience of writing and reading this text as a clinical
treatment.40 Assuming the role of one who has benefited from study and
reflection in the disciplines of social psychology and legal education, I am
writing this text in the belief that professionals (and their clients) who come
to understand the material I am presenting will become more productive
and responsible in their clinical work. The readers I care most about are
those who have chosen to engage with the text for purposes of professional
development, but I will be delighted if readers who began to read this essay
for other purposes should also find themselves better able to understand
their clinical experience. This is a conversation I am carrying on with you,
even though I must construct you in my mind without the benefit of
observation and direct feedback, and even though your reading this text
may have been required.41
The treatment I am offering here fosters cognitive learning most
directly, helping you, in your roles as professionals or as clients, to
recognize and better understand aspects of your clinical experiences. When
we participate in social systems, such as those through which professional
services are rendered and received, we make decisions on the basis of the
models of human behavior and social processes which we carry in our
minds. However primitive or sophisticated, inchoate or articulate, uncon-
scious or conscious, these models influence the goals we select and the
effectiveness and responsibility with which we pursue them. If I succeed in
influencing your perceptions of clinical experience, I will change the world
in which you live and work. While cognitive learning is the immediate goal,
40. This exercise no doubt stretches the concept of clinic (see note 1 supra) in that while I write
I must construct my reader/client in my mind without the benefit of return communica-
tion. This process has been facilitated by my use of drafts of this text in my law school
course, "Understanding Clinical Experience" and in an interdisciplinary "Workshop on
Understanding Clinical Experience." My use of this article as a metaphor for a clinical
event is heavily influenced by James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning
(Chicago, 1984). The references in the footnotes indicate the extent of my debt.
41. For example, the editors of the journal to which I submitted the text for publication were
required to read it by the responsibilities of their positions.
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that learning may lead you further: to perceive the need to acquire new
skills and to make different choices in your clinical roles and relationships. 42
If treatments such as the one to which you are now exposing yourself
always involve changes in the participants, the question arises: Who is
changing whom, and according to whose agenda? As clients enter new
worlds in their clinical work, they cannot know fully what they are letting
themselves in for. Professionals who influence their clients to enter a new
world of knowledge, skills, and roles and relationships should not pretend
that their clients are making entirely free choices.
In this text I am engaging in political action: in attempting to influence
readers in the ways stated, I aim to alter the clinical institutions and
professions in which they participate and, through them, the larger society.
But while I pursue my agenda, I am being used by the existing political
world with which I have had to make my bargains to find my place to work.
Using the tools (concepts and language) professional disciplines make
available to me limits me, although I have sought to remake and use them
for my purposes. Professionals and their clients get the best they can from
professional worlds created for interests that may not be their own.43
Our professional poses tend to be ones of rational neutrality, but
professional disciplines, as recreated in the mind of each professional, carry
implicit values, whether of health, law, or something else. Issues of ethics
and politics in clinical work are screened from our attention by the myth
that professional work is rational and value-neutral. The view of our
practices as "scientific" has heuristic value, but it also falsifies the nature of
our work.44
Our clients (including you, my readers) have good cause to approach us
with some wariness, for, although we cannot force them to acquiesce in our
point of view45 and may even wish to treat their autonomy with respect, it
may not be so easy to distinguish respect from manipulation. The effects of
treatment may be surprising,46 and there are coercive elements in clinical
situations in which clients are convinced that they must acquiesce in the
treatment to obtain an essential goal (recover their health, retain custody of
their children, obtain a good grade in a course, and so forth). So the
question remains whether it is possible to act as a professional and respect
a client's autonomy.
To act with our clients on an ethic of mutual respect requires that we
adopt the role of learner as well as persuader.
The true center of value of a [professional discipline], its most important meaning, is
to be found in the community that it establishes with its [clients]. It is here that the
[professional] offers his [client] a place to stand, a place from which he can observe
42. See White, supra note 40, at 15.
43. See White, supra note 40, at 17-18. Cf. Maureen Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and
the Client: Towards a Radical Conception, 7 Int'l J. Soc. L. 331 (1979).
44. See White, supra note 40, at 21-22.
45. Id. at 16-17.
46. Cf. White's discussion of Swift's Tale of a Tub, in id., ch. 5.
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and judge the characters and events of the world he creates, indeed the world
itself...47
I have no intention of claiming the final word on these issues. My entire
article is in one aspect a response to the tension between promoting change
and respecting autonomy. Grappling with the ethics and politics of treat-
ment is 'the daily challenge of clinical work.
Figure 2. The Hidden Man Revealed. 48
47. Id. at 17. I have substituted "professional discipline" for "text," "clients" for "reader," and
"professional" for "author."
48. Abercrombie, supra note 3, at 144.
